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Abstract in English 
We study the extent to which a country's strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection 
mediates knowledge spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Following the opposing 
views in the IPR debate, we propose a negative effect of IPR strength on unintentional horizontal 
(intra-industry) knowledge diffusion, and a positive effect on intentional vertical (inter-industry) 
knowledge diffusion. Using a unique firm-level dataset of large, publicly traded firms in 22 
(mostly) developed countries, we find partial support for these expectations. Strong IPR indeed 
reduces horizontal knowledge diffusion, while it stimulates backward (to suppliers) knowledge 
diffusion. Somewhat unexpectedly however, we also find that forward (to customers) knowledge 
diffusion decreases with IPR strength. In general, and in line with earlier literature, the results 
regarding backward knowledge diffusion are most robust to changes in model specification. Our 
results contribute to the debate regarding the desirability of strengthening national IPR systems, 
and suggest that local firms might indeed benefit from this through their (backward) linkages 
with multinationals. Additionally, our results suggest that the moderating effect of IPR strength 
might partly explain the inconclusive results in the FDI knowledge diffusion literature. 
Key words: Intellectual property rights, knowledge diffusion, multinationals, FDI 
JEL codes: F23, O33, O34 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
In deze studie onderzoeken we het effect van nationale bescherming van intellectueel eigendom 
(IE) op kennisdiffusie van multinationals. We verwachten dat een toename van IE bescherming 
enerzijds tot minder horizontale kennisdiffusie naar concurrenten leidt, omdat deze vorm van 
diffusie vaak onbedoeld (d.w.z. een externaliteit) is. Anderzijds zal verticale kennisdiffusie naar 
leveranciers en afnemers toenemen, omdat het risico op oneigenlijk gebruik na deze doelbewuste 
kennistransfer daalt. Onze analyse van 2500 grote bedrijven in 22 (ontwikkelde) landen 
gedurende de periode 2000-2005 is deels conform deze verwachtingen. Kennisdiffusie naar 
concurrenten neemt af, en kennisdiffusie naar leveranciers neemt toe wanneer IE bescherming 
stijgt. Kennisdiffusie naar afnemers neemt echter ook onverwacht toe in dit geval. De resultaten 
met betrekking tot kennisdiffusie richting leveranciers zijn het meest robuust. Onze resultaten 
suggereren dat een toename van IE bescherming in het voordeel van lokale bedrijven is wanneer 
deze stevige toeleveringsrelaties hebben met multinationals. Verder bieden onze resultaten een 
gedeeltelijke verklaring voor het gebrek aan eenduidige resultaten in de literatuur rondom 
kennisdiffusie van multinationals. 
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Abstract
We study the extent to which a country's strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
protection mediates knowledge spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Following
the opposing views in the IPR debate, we propose a negative eect of IPR strength on
unintentional horizontal (intra-industry) knowledge diusion, and a positive eect on in-
tentional vertical (inter-industry) knowledge diusion. Using a unique rm-level dataset
of large, publicly traded rms in 22 (mostly) developed countries, we nd partial support
for these expectations. Strong IPR indeed reduces horizontal knowledge diusion, while it
stimulates backward (to suppliers) knowledge diusion. Somewhat unexpectedly however,
we also nd that forward (to customers) knowledge diusion decreases with IPR strength.
In general, and in line with earlier literature, the results regarding backward knowledge
diusion are most robust to changes in model specication. Our results contribute to the
debate regarding the desirability of strengthening national IPR systems, and suggest that
local rms might indeed benet from this through their (backward) linkages with multina-
tionals. Additionally, our results suggest that the moderating eect of IPR strength might
partly explain the inconclusive results in the FDI knowledge diusion literature.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, knowledge diusion, multinationals, FDI
1 Introduction
Over the past couple of decades, many countries have witnessed important developments towards
a stronger system of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection (Maskus, 2000; Branstetter
et al., 2006). Nonetheless, there has been considerable debate regarding the desirability of a
Corresponding author: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, P.O. Box 80510, 2508 GM,
The Hague, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 70 338 3423. E: R.Smeets@cpb.nl.
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strong IPR system. On the one hand, proponents argue that it will induce innovation world-
wide, and enhance cross-country technology transfer. On the other hand, it has been argued
that increased IPR will shift the rents of innovation towards multinationals (MNEs) as they
are better able to appropriate technological developments, at the expense of small (national)
rms. Stated dierently, strong IPR reduces static eciency by increasing the marginal costs of
knowledge diusion, but supports dynamic eciency by stimulating innovation (Maskus, 2000).
Empirical research has so far remained relatively silent on the matter.1 Two important
recent exceptions are Branstetter et al. (2006) and Branstetter et al. (2010). Branstetter et al.
(2006) investigate how US MNEs respond to increased IPR strength by means of parent-aliate
international technology transfer. They oer convincing evidence that such transfers increase
signicantly following IPR reform. Branstetter et al. (2010) additionally show that industry-
level value added increases after IPR reform, which they take as evidence that reduced imitative
local activity is more than oset by increased MNE activity and activity of non-imititating lo-
cal rms. However, these two studies do not address the eects on local rms due to potential
changes in MNE knowledge diusion.
Our aim in this study is to assess the mediating impact of national IPR strength on MNE
knowledge diusion to local rms. To this end, we employ a unique rm-level dataset span-
ning 22 (mostly) developed countries during the period 2000-2005. In our empirical setup,
we exploit the conceptual dierence between horizontal (intra-industry) versus vertical (inter-
industry) knowledge diusion. In particular, we argue that horizontal knowledge diusion is
dominated by unintentional spillovers, which IPR systems aim to reduce. By contrast, vertical
knowledge diusion is dominated by intentional transfers, which are encouraged under strong
IPR. We are thus able to assess the relative importance of the two opposing eects of increased
IPR strength on FDI knowledge diusion.
The empirical results partly corroborate our expectations. Whithout accounting for the im-
pact of IPR strength, we nd no robust knowledge diusion eect from MNEs in any direction.
Yet when allowing for knowledge diusion to vary with IPR strength, we nd robust evidence
that backward knowledge diusion (transfer towards suppliers) increases with stronger IPR.
Somewhat unexpectedly, forward knowledge diusion (transfer towards customers) decreases
1There is a rather large literature on the impact of IPR strength on the amount and composition of trade and
FDI countries receive (e.g Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Lee and Manseld, 1996; Smith, 2001; Javorcik, 2004a).
However, the consequences for technology transfer or innovation in general remain unclear from these studies.
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with IPR strength. Finally, and in line with expectations, horizontal knowledge spillovers are
also aected negatively by stronger IPR. The results regarding backward diusion are most
robust to changes in model specications.
The local benets following Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) by MNEs has been the domain
of a large literature studying knowledge spillovers from FDI (Javorcik, 2004b). These studies
have become notorious for their widely divergent ndings (cf. Gorg and Strobl, 2001; Gorg
and Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008). It has been argued that this is because many empirical
estimates simultaneously incorporate positive knowledge diusion eects, as well as negative
consequences of inward FDI activity due to e.g. competitive pressures (Aitken and Harrison,
1999). Conditioning the impact of MNE activity in a way which induces positive eects to
dominate negative eects (or vice versa) may partly help to solve the ambiguity (Castellani
and Zanfei, 2006). National IPR strength is such a conditioning mechanism. Yet so far, none
of the studies in this eld has considered the impact of national IPR strength on the extent
of knowledge spillovers from FDI, presumably because of lack of cross-country rm-level data
(Javorcik, 2008).
By focusing on the impact of IPR strength, our study thus also adds to the literature on
knowledge spillovers from FDI in general. Moreover, our study shows that IPR systems achieve
what they are supposed to achieve, which is to correct a market faillure by decreasing knowl-
edge externalities. However, we also nd that MNEs more easily share their knowledge and
technology with their local suppliers under strong IPR, thus enhancing the local host-country
knowledge base. A simple back-of-the-envelope evaluation suggests that the positive eects on
backward knowledge diusion tend to outweigh the negative eects through decreased hori-
zontal and forward knowledge diusion, although this conclusion depends somewhat on how
conservatively one wishes to interpret the estimation results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulates the theoretical expec-
tations regarding the impact of IPR on MNE knowledge diusion. It characterizes the nature
of the dierent diusion eects and relates these to IPR strength. Section 3 describes the data
and the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness checks. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
3
2 FDI knowledge diusion: spillovers and transfers
Many studies have documented signicant productivity advantages of MNEs and their foreign
aliates over national (host-country) rms (Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999; Markusen, 2002).
The recent heterogeneous rms literature has attributed this productivity advantage to the high
xed costs of foreign investment, leading only the most productive rms to engage in FDI (Help-
man et al., 2004). Accordingly, there is a lot of potential for knowledge or technology to diuse
from MNE aliates to relatively backward local rms. As such, MNEs play an important role
in international cross-country technology diusion.
The literature on knowledge diusion from FDI has generally distinguished three channels
along which knowledge or technology can diuse between MNE aliates and host-country rms
(cf. Gorg and Greenaway, 2004; Javorcik, 2004b): First, MNE products and practices may be
copied or imitated by local rms, which is the so-called demonstration eect. Second, MNEs
might assist their suppliers and customers in various aspects of e.g. quality control or product
management. These eects thus work through vertical linkages. Third, workers employed by
MNE aliates may be (re)employed by local rms, so that knowledge diuses through labor
turnover. Although many studies have empirically scrutinized these eects empirically, surveys
of this literature have repeatedly pointed out their widely divergent results (Blomstrom and
Kokko, 1998; Gorg and Strobl, 2001; Gorg and Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008).
One of the reasons for this ambiguity may be due to the methodology employed, which
usually relates (changes in) local rms' Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to inward MNE ac-
tivity. Even though knowledge diusion can be expected to increase TFP, it has been pointed
out that negative productivity eects might also arise simultaneously. For instance, Aitken and
Harrison (1999) argue that local rms' productivity might decline due to an adverse competi-
tion eect generated by MNE activity. In particular, if rms incur xed costs of production,
MNEs may nd it optimal to draw demand from their local competitors and force them back up
their average cost curve. If the production contraction is large enough, this could outweigh any
positive productivity eects. Adverse productivity eects could also arise for local suppliers
and customers of MNEs (Javorcik, 2008). If the MNE acts a monopsonist towards its local
suppliers, their (revenue based) TFP could be adversely aected due to the downward pressure
on their price margins. Similarly, MNEs might act as monopolists towards their local customers
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by forcing them to pay higher prices relative to the local suppliers that they displace.
In sum, measured productivity responses of local rms due to MNE activity can go either
way, and generally empirical estimates will incorporate both the positive and negative eects.
Yet if we can establish conditions under which the positive eects dominate the negative eects
(or vice versa), we might be able to partly solve this ambiguity (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006).
Because national IPR sytems inuence the knowledge diusion impact of MNEs while leaving
its competition eects (relatively) unaected, the strength of national IPR systems provides
such a conditional mechanism. As we will argue, however, the way the impact is conditional on
IPR strength crucially depends on the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI knowl-
edge diusion due to the dierent nature of the knowledge diusion implied.
Knowledge diusion in general may be thought of to occur both intentionally as well as
unintentionally. In the latter case, it constitutes an externality and therefore a market failure,
and it is usually termed a knowledge spillover. Intentional knowledge diusion is usually coined
a knowledge transfer, comprising the intra-rm diusion of knowledge studied in Branstetter
et al. (2006) or the deliberate transfer of knowledge to local rms in order to ascertain quality
in the supply chain (Javorcik, 2008). A well designed IPR system corrects the market faillure
that occurs due to knowledge spillovers by providing innovators with sucient means to ap-
propriate their ideas and inventions. By reducing the possibility for knowledge spillovers, this
should induce them to increase the resources invested in innovation, as their private optimal
investment shifts closer towards the social optimum. However, it is also expected to increase
knowledge transfer exactly because it reduces the risk of ex-post expropriation, as demonstrated
in Branstetter et al. (2006) for intra-MNE technology transfer. Consequently, a trade-o arises
from increasing national IPR strength: On the one hand, knowledge diusion diminishes through
decreased spillovers. On the other hand, knowledge diusion surges through increased transfers.
We argue that these two dierent types of knowledge diusion are naturally related to the
direction of knowledge diusion from FDI. First consider horizontal knowledge diusion. Con-
ceptually, this constitutes knowledge diusion towards local competitor rms within the industry
(Saggi, 2002), occuring mainly through labor turnover and demonstration eects (Manseld and
Romeo, 1980; Javorcik, 2008). MNE aliates have nothing to gain by intentionally engaging in
such knowledge diusion, as it will erode the competitive edge they have over local host-country
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rms. Indeed, as noted by Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), \[...] pure demonstration eects often
take place unconsciously [...]" (p.15). This type of knowledge diusion thus constitutes a true
externality, and hence is dominated by knowledge spillovers.
Vertical knowledge diusion on the other hand occurs between MNEs and their local suppli-
ers and customers, i.e. through vertical linkages. Conceptually, this is a very dierent kind of
diusion, as it is mainly intentional. The reason is that MNEs have much to gain from increased
input and (nal) output quality, as it further establishes and strengthens their competitive po-
sition in local markets. Recent survey evidence documented by Javorcik (2008), designed to
investigate the implications of foreign entry for domestic Czech and Latvian rms, corroborates
this view. For instance, fourty percent of Czech supplying rms report having received some
kind of MNE assistance, such as personnel training, leasing of machinery, or assistance with
technology (cf. Figure 5, p.151 in Javorcik, 2008).2 Hence, (inter-rm) knowledge transfer plays
a key role in vertical knowledge diusion from FDI.
The dierent nature of horizontal versus vertical MNE knowledge diusion leads to two
opposing expecations.3 First, increased IPR strength should reduce the amount of knowledge
spillovers. Hence, given adverse horizontal competition eects, we expect that positive knowl-
edge diusion eects dominate in low IPR countries (and vice versa in high IPR countries).
Second, increased IPR reduces the risks of knowledge transfer by strengthening the means to
appropriate knowledge and technology by MNEs. Consequently, we expect vertical knowledge
diusion to rise with increased IPR strength (in the same spirit as the increased intra-MNE tech-
nology transfer documented in Branstetter et al. (2006)), so that they dominate adverse vertical
competition eects in high IPR countries (and vice versa in low IPR countries). These divergent
expectations allow us to test the trade-o embodied in increasing national IPR strength. Addi-
tionally, they oer a potential explanation for the widely divergent ndings in (single country)
2A substantially smaller amount of Czech MNE customers (6 percent) report having received assistance on
how to use MNE inputs. Hence, vertical knowledge diusion from MNEs appears to be more substantial upstream
than downstream.
3Two comments are in order. First, by arguing that horizontal (vertical) knowledge diusion will be domi-
nated by knowledge spillovers (transfers), we do not deny that in practice both horizontal and vertical knowledge
diusion will be a mix of spillovers and transfers. However, given the dierent nature of the relationships be-
tween the MNE and the receiving local rms (competitors versus suppliers or customers), overall we would expect
spillovers to drive horizontal knowledge diusion and transfers to drive vertical knowledge diusion. Second, we
only focus on rst-order eects here. That is, we do not consider knowledge spillovers among local upstream
or downstream rms that might result after vertical FDI knowledge transfer. Nor do we consider knowledge
transfers between local rms that might result after horizontal FDI knowledge spillovers. Given that these eects
are indirect (i.e. of higher order), we do not expect these to dominate the outcomes.
6
studies on FDI knowledge diusion.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data and variables
Our rm-level data are derived from Thomson's Worldscope database. Our access to this
database provides us with a sample that contains a panel of about 2,500 non-nancial local rms
and 324 foreign-owned rms that are active in 22 countries and 16 manufacturing industries
(at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level) during the period 2000-2005. Data on ownership was derived
from the \Who owns whom" database, from which we could subtract data on ownership shares
and identities for all the rms in our sample for the year 2004. We use this information in
constructing the horizontal and vertical MNE presence variables below. Table 1 presents some
descriptive statistic regarding the allocation of (foreign owned) rms accross the countries in
our sample. In the Appendix we provide more details regarding the exact construction of the
rm-level dataset.
<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
Our main independent variables of interest concern the presence of MNEs, both within the local
rms' own industries, as well as in upstream and downstream industries. Intra-industry MNE
presence is measured as follows (cf. Javorcik, 2004b):
Horizontaljt =
Pnj
i=1(i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
(1)
where i, j and t index rms, industries and years respectively, nj denotes the total number of
foreign owned rms in industry j, and i denotes the share of foreign ownership in rm i.
4 Nj
denotes the total number of rms in industry j. Sales denote rm-level sales.
In line with Javorcik (2004b) we use industry-level input and output shares (constructed from
the OECD Input-Output tables) to compute vertical linkages.5 Specically, if jk denotes the
output share of industry j owing to industry k (with j 6= k), backward linkages (to supplying
4We omit country subscripts k but note that all MNE presence variables are computed per country.
5The most recent I-O tables available for the period of study are for 2002. We use these tables to compute
(constant) input-output shares for the entire sample period.
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industries) are computed as:
Backwardjt =
X
j 6=k
(jk Horizontalkt) (2)
where Horizontal is dened as in (1). Similarly, letting jk denote the share of inputs obtained
by industry j from industry k, we construct forward linkages as:6
Forwardjt =
X
j 6=k
(jk Horizontalkt) (3)
Table 2 presents the average degree of foreign ownership per industry, as well as its standard
deviation. In industries such as \Motor vehicles" and \Food and beverages" the average foreign
ownership share is relatively low, contrary to industries such as \Wood and wood products". It
might be the case that there are unobserved industry-level characteristics which cause these av-
erage ownership shares to diverge accross industries. In the empirical specication we therefore
include xed eects (FE) to account for this possibility.
<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>
We follow the extant literature on knowledge diusion from FDI and consider the eect of
Horizontal, Backward and Forward on local rms' productivity (Gorg and Strobl, 2001; Ja-
vorcik, 2004b; Blalock and Gertler, 2008). In order to do so, we rst estimate industry-level
production functions, explaining value added from capital and labor inputs (at the two-digit
ISIC Rev. 3 level).7 Next to an idiosyncratic component, the error term in this production
function contains a measure of rm-level productivity. Because of this, the error term is cor-
related with factor inputs, as the (variable) input decisions are made partly in response to the
productivity contained in the error term (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).
As is standard in the literature, we follow the procedure in Olley and Pakes (1996) to correct
for this simultaneity bias. Table A.1 in the Appendix compares the coecients for labor and
capital stocks obtained in this way with those obtained through simple OLS. In the majority of
6Javorcik (2004b) nets out MNE exports when computing Horizontal in this case, since such exports are not
destined for the local market. Due to lack of rm-level export data, we cannot follow this approach.
7Preferably, we would have estimated country-industry specic production functions, as the parameters in
the production function are likely to vary both accross industries as well as countries. However, in many cases
this yields too few observations to generate consistent parameter estimates.
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cases the Olley-Pakes coecients deviate in the expected way from the OLS coecients.8
We further add two rm-level control variables: First, we incorporate a measure of rm
size, which is the (log of) total assets of rms. The expected eect of this variable is positive,
as many studies have demonstrated a positive correlation between rm size and productivity
(e.g. Haltiwanger et al., 1999). Second, we also include the the share of rm sales in total
industry-level sales, to capture the rm's competitive power. Again, we expect this variable to
enter with a positive sign (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
In order to measure the strength of the national IPR systems of the countries in our sample,
we employ the widely-used Ginarte and Park-index of IPR strength (Ginarte and Park, 1997;
Javorcik, 2004a). This IPR index is a composite of ve dierent components, that capture
(1) the extent of coverage, (2) whether or not a country participates in international patent
agreements, (3) whether there are provisions for loss of protection, (4) the quality of enforce-
ment mechanisms, and (5) the duration of protection.9 Each individual component is rated on
a scale from 0 (weak IPR protection) to 1 (strong IPR protection), so that the (unweighted)
index varies between 0 and 5.10 The most recent values relevant for our sample period are for
2000 and 2005.11 In the main specications below, we use the 2000 index, which corresponds
to IPR strength at the start of our sample. This should mitigate concerns that IPR strength
develops in response to MNE knowledge diusion, for instance when MNEs that intensively
transfer technology to their suppliers actively lobby for strengthening national IPR systems
(cf. Ahlquist and Prakash, 2008). In the robustness analysis we also run our model with the
2005 IPR index. Table 1 presents the IPR index for each country in our sample. Because the
countries in our sample are mainly developed countries whose IPR systems are already quite
well developed, the variation on the index is relatively low. The minimum score is 2.9 for Hong
Kong, versus a maximum of 5 for the United States.
In order to investigate if the theoretical expectations are also borne out by the raw data, we
rst inspect some simple correlations. Specically, we divide our sample into high versus low
IPR countries, where we use the median index (4.2) as the cuto. We then plot industry-level
8Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) describe an alternative approach to Olley and Pakes (1996) which can be used
when there are a lot of rms with zero investment. Given that we only look at large, publicly traded rms in our
sample, this is not a problem in our case.
9A more elaborate discussion of these individual components and how they have been measured can be found
in Ginarte and Park (1997).
10It should be noted that this measure tends to capture de jure IPR strength rather than de facto IPR strength.
11We thank professor Park for sharing the updated dataset with us.
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correlations between the (log) TFP of local rms and the Horizontal, Backward and Forward
shares as dened above. Figures 1-3 plot these correlations, distinguishing between high and
low IPR countries.
<< INSERT FIGURES 1-3 ABOUT HERE>>
All gures show clearly diverging and opposite correlations between MNE sales shares and
local TFP for high versus low IPR countries. A couple of features are noteworthy: First,
the patterns correspond to the theoretical expectations formulated in Section 2. Specically,
Figure 1 shows a clear positive correlation between Horizontal and TFP only for low IPR
countries. For Backward and Forward, by contrast, Figures 2 and 3 show that a positive
correlation only exists for high IPR countries. This accords well with the theoretical prediction
that better IPR facilitates the transfer of knowledge, but reduces knowledge spillovers. Second,
Horizontal correlates negatively with TFP in high IPP countries, and Backward and Forward
correlate negatively with TFP in low IPR countries. This corresponds to our contention that
adverse competition eects generated by MNE presence will dominate any positive knowledge
diusion eects in high IPR countries (for Horizontal) or low IPR countries (for Backward
and Forward). Finally, the correlations in Figure 3 are substantially less pronounced than in
the other two gures. This corresponds to the general ndings in the literature, mentioned in
Section 2, that no or only small eects of forward linkages can be found(Javorcik, 2008; Kugler,
2006).
Despite the correspondence between these gures and our expectations, it is also clear that
there is large variation along the predicted ts. We will have to turn to more formal econometric
analysis to see if these patterns are robust to various controls for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. Before presenting the results, we rst briey discuss the empirical model.
3.2 Empirical strategy
As mentioned in the previous section, we follow the extant literature on FDI knowledge diusion
and investigate the impact of intra and inter-industry MNE presence on local rms' TFP. Our
approach diers from previous studies in that we allow this impact to vary with the strength of
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national IPR systems. Our empirical model looks as follows:
TFPijkt =0 + 1Horizontaljkt + 2Backwardjkt + 3Forwardjkt + 4HorizontaljktIPRk
+ 5BackwardjktIPRk + 6ForwardjktIPRk +Xit + "ijkt
s.t. "ijkt = i + j + k + t + ijkt
(4)
where i, j, k and t index rm, industry, country and year respectively, and X is a vector with
the two rm-level controls described in the previous section. The error term " is a composite of
unobserved rm, industry, country, and time specic heterogeneity, and an idiosyncratic com-
ponent .
Following the discussion in Section 2 regarding horizontal FDI knowledge diusion, we ex-
pect 4 to be negative, because knowledge spillover eects decrease in high IPR countries and
negative competition eects start to dominate. Accordingly, we expect 1 to be positive because
it mainly captures the positive horizontal knowledge spillovers eects in low IPR countries. In
contrast, for backward and forward knowledge diusion we expect the individual eects 2 and
3 to be negative, because weak IPR regimes generate little vertical knowledge diusion, so that
adverse vertical competition eects dominate. Accordingly, 5 and 6 should be positive, since
increased IPR strength increases vertical knowledge diusion.
In order to account for the unobserved heterogeneity, we run model (4) with rm xed eects
(FE). Since none of the rms in our sample switches industries or countries, this simultaneously
takes care of all unobserved heterogeneity, except for t.
12 In order to take care of this latter
component, we also run the model including year FE. Additionally, we have to account for the
multiple levels of observation in our model when computing standard errors (Moulton, 1990).
The standard practice in the literature is to cluster standard errors at the industry level (Ja-
vorcik, 2004b; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). However, since we also have multiple countries
in our sample, we also have to address the possibility that rms operating in the same country
might be simultaneously exposed to country-level shocks. Therefore, we cluster our standard
errors at the country-industry level.13
Another well-known issue in the FDI knowledge diusion literature is the potential endo-
12This also implies that including any time-invariant industry or country-level variables - such as the IPR
index - individually in the model is not necessary, as these will be accounted for in the xed eects.
13This yields a total of 338 clusters, which should be sucient for computing robust standard errors (Moulton,
1990).
11
geneity of the MNE sales share variables. Specically, if MNEs choose to invest mainly in the
most productive industries or regions of a host-country, this could induce a reverse causality
when estimating the model in (4). However, nding proper instruments for the MNE presence
variables is notoriously dicult, especially in our setup with multiple countries and industries.
We address this issue in two alternative ways. First, we also run the model including one-
period lagged values of the MNE presence variables, to establish Granger causality (Granger,
1969). Second, instead of running a GLS FE model, we also experiment with running the
model by means of the system GMM estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998). This approach
simultaneously estimates two equations: The level equation in (4), as well as its rst-dierenced
counterpart. It then uses lagged rst-dierences as instruments for the MNE variables in the
level equation, and lagged levels as instruments for the MNE variables in the rst-dierenced
equation. The key assumptions for these instruments to be valid is that the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of the error term ijkt is not serially correlated, and that the explanatory variables are
not correlated with future realizations of the error term. We report results for formal tests of
these assumptions below.14
4 Results
We rst run the model in (4) without including the IPR interaction terms, in order to consider
the unmoderated impact of MNE presence. Table 3 presents the results. Column 1 is the GLS
FE model without year dummies. As can be seen, none of the MNE variables has a signicant
impact on TFP, except for Forward, which is negative. Column 2 adds the year dummies
to control for unobserved time heterogeneity. In addition to Forward, now Backward is also
signicant but with a positive sign. Column 3 uses lagged values of the MNE variables in
order to partly address the endogeneity issue. None of the MNE knowledge diusion eects
are robust to this change in specication, as both the eects of Backward and Forward turn
insignicant. Finally, column 4 runs the model in (4) using the system GMM estimator by
Blundell and Bond (1998) to control for the endogeneity of the MNE variables. Again, none of
the MNE eects are robust to this alternative estimation method. However, inspection of both
14When applying system GMM estimation, we employ STATA's XTABOND2 command by Roodman (2009).
We follow the various suggestions in this paper when estimating the model.
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the Sargan and Hansen test statistics for instrument validity indicates that the instruments
are not exogenous. Taken together, these results mirror the ambiguity in the literature and
underline the notion that the estimated coecients incorporate both positive and negative
productivity eects simultaneously.
<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >>
The two rm-level control variables consistently show up with a positive and signicant co-
ecient, indicating that both absolute rm size and relative (to the industry) rm size are
conducive to a rm's TFP. The only exception is the impact of rm size (assets) in the GMM
specication, which is negative and signicant. Although this result is somewhat puzzling, we
recall that this specication suers from instrument endogeneity, which might bias the results.
In terms of explanatory power, given the multiple levels of observation in our analysis the GLS
models perform reasonably well, with R2's between 8.2% and 14%.
We now add the interactions with national IPR strength to the model. Table 4 presents the
results. The setup is the same as in Table 3. First consider the baseline specication in column
1. Results are very dierent from those in Table 3. Specically, the results for Horizontal and
Backward are in line with expectations: The individual eect of Horizontal is positive whereas
the interaction with IPR is negative, indicating that horizontal knowledge spillovers are posi-
tive in low IPR countries, but decrease with IPR strength. For Backward this is exactly the
opposite: Backward linkages are negative in low IPR countries, but positive knowledge transfers
eects increase with IPR strength. These results corroborate the correlations shown in Figures
1 and 2. The eects of Forward, however, are not in line with expectations. Forward eects
are positive in low IPR countries but decrease with IPR strength. As we discuss in the next
section, this might be due to the fact that we only include manufacturing rms in our sample.
Finally, as shown in the bottom of the table, the F-statistic that tests whether the additional
explanatory power of this model over that in column 1 in Table 3 is statistically sucient is
signicant at 1% (the critical value is 3.78).15
<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >>
15The statistic is computed as ((R22 R21)=(K2 K1))=((1 R22)=(N  K2  1)) where R2 is the R-squared, K
is the number of estimated parameters, N is the number of observations, and subscripts 1 and 2 index the model
excluding and including interactions respectively. The R2 reported in Table 4 does not dier from that in Table
3 due to rounding at two decimals. The increased explanatory power, albeit small, is still statistically signicant
due to the relatively large number of observations in our model.
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Column 2 adds year dummies to the model. Even though all coecients decrease somewhat
in absolute value, all eects remain robust to this change in specication. Column 3 uses
one-year lagged values of the MNE variables. This leaves the signs of all coecients intact,
but Horizontal and its interaction with IPR become insignicant. Finally, column 4 employs
the system GMM estimator. The results mirror those in column 3, although the coecient
estimates decrease substantially in absolute value. As before, however, the Sargan and Hansen
test statistics indicate that the instruments are not exogenous at regular signicance levels. As
in column 1, the F-statistics all indicate a signicant increase in explanatory power over the
models reported in Table 3.16
Table 5 presents the results of ve dierent robustness analyses. All models include the 1-
year lagged MNE variables, except when indicated otherwise. Column 1 reruns the model while
excluding Hong Kong from the sample. The reason for doing so is that Hong Kong displays a
strong gap in terms of IPR strength relative to the other countries in the sample, which might
drive some of the results.17 As can be seen, the results for Backward and Forward are robust
to this exclusion. Moreover, Horizontal and its interaction with IPR becomes signicant again,
with the expected signs.
<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >>
Our sample exhibits a lot of observations with a zero value on either Horizontal, Backward,
and Forward, as there are many country-industry pairs that do not have any (vertical) MNE
activity. In order to ensure that these zero values do not drive our results, column 2 in Table
5 excludes them from the sample. The results for all MNE variables are robust to this sample
reduction and remain signicant. All coecient estimates increase somewhat across the board.
The choice of a one-year lag might not be sucient to account for the endogeneity of MNE
activity, nor for knowledge diusion to take full eect. Therefore, in column 3 we repeat the
analyses while using two-year lags for the MNE variables.18 The results for Horizontal and
V ertical are robust and retain their expected signs. However, in this case Forward and its
16We do not report a F-statistic for the system GMM model because this model does not yield a (meaningful)
R2.
17The 2000 IPR index for Hong Kong is 2.9, whereas Canada and Norway, who are next in line, exhibit an
IPR index of 3.9. The standard deviation of the 2000 IPR index is 0.48 including Hong Kong, whereas it is 0.33
excluding Hong Kong.
18Manseld and Romeo (1980) document an average lag between intra-MNE technology transfer and inter-rm
technology diusion between 1.5 and 4 years. Our choice of a two-year lag is within this range. Due to the short
time-span of our panel, using deeper lags substantially reduces the number of observations.
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interaction with IPR become insignifcant.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we also have IPR index values for the year 2005, which cor-
responds to the end of our sample period. Although using this index might raise concerns
regarding the endogeneity of IPR strength to MNE knowledge diusion, column 4 uses the 2005
IPR index as a robustness check.19 The results stronlgy resemble those in column 3 of Table
4, with Horizontal and its interaction insignicant, Backward and its interaction with IPR
showing up signicantly and with the expected signs, while Forward and its interaction are
signicant but with the wrong signs.
Finally, a concern might be that instead of IPR strength, our IPR index is actually picking
up on economic development in general, given that IPR strength and economic development
tend to be related.20 This might confound our estimates in two ways. On the one hand, rms
in developed countries arguably have high absorptive capacity which supports the extent to
wich they benet from knowledge diusion (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). On the other hand,
because of the small technology gap between local rms and foreign investors, it might be ar-
gued that they have little room to benet from MNE knowledge diusion (Grith et al., 2004).
The former argument could explain the positive impact of IPR on backward diusion, whereas
the latter could underly the negative impact of IPR on horizontal and forward diusion. To
investigate this, in column 5 of Table 5 we include acountry's (log) GDP per capita, as well as
its interaction with the three diusion variables. 21 The results show that interacting with GDP
yields all of the Horizontal results insignicant. The Backward and Forward results are more
robust. In particular, the interactions with IPR remain (marginally) signicant. GDP itself
has a positive eect on local rms' productivity, possibly as a result of tougher competition in
larger, more developed markets (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).22
Finally, in order to illustrate the moderating eect of IPR, Figure 4 shows the predicted
impact of Horizontal, Backward and Forward for the dierent IPR values that the countries
19Given the short time-span of our sample, the changes in the IPR index are not very substantial. In particular,
only two countries in our sample exhibit such a change: Korea (from 4.2 to 4.33) and Singapore (from 4.05 to
4.21).
20The correlation coecient between IPR (in 2000) and log GDP per capita in our sample is 0.23.
21Data on per capita GDP are taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). It is
measured in constant international (PPP) US dollars.
22Because of the apparent strong impact of excluding Hong Kong from the sample, we also ran the models
in columns 2-5 excluding Hong Kong. The most notable eect is that in this case, also Horizontal and its
interaction with IPR becomes signicant with the expected signs. The results are not presented but are available
upon request.
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in our sample exhibit.23
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE >>
The gure shows that for Horizontal (Backward), the implied positive (negative) eects on
TFP in the low IPR countries of our sample are relatively small. Moreover, the total impact
of Horizontal is small in general compared to the eects of both Backward and Forward.
Additionally, the gure demonstrates that even in the country with the lowest IPR strength in
our sample, the forward productivity eects are negative.24 All in all, the vertical impact of
MNE activity seems to substantially outweigh the horizontal impact.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Acknowledging that MNEs are an important vehicle for international technology diusion, we
investigate the impact of national IPR protection on horizontal and vertical knowledge diu-
sion from FDI to domestic host-country rms. The debate regarding the costs and benets of
strengthening national IPR systems centers around two arguments: On the one hand, stronger
IPR protection decreases static eciency as it raises the marginal costs of knowledge diusion
by limiting knowledge externalities or spillovers. On the other hand, it enhances dynamic e-
ciency by stimulating innovation and international technology transfer. Even though previous
empirical research has examined parts of this debate, so far no study has investigated the ul-
timate impact of increasing IPR protection on national (domestic) rms. To study these two
arguments, we exploit the dierent nature of horizontal (intra-industry) knowledge diusion and
vertical (inter-industry) knowledge diusion. As the former mainly constitutes an externality or
spillover, increased IPR strength should diminish its occurence. The opposite holds for vertical
diusion, as this occurs mainly through (inter-rm) knowledge transfer.
Our results partly corrobarate these expectations. They are strongest and most robust for
backward or upstream knowledge diusion, i.e. from MNEs to their local suppliers. We consis-
tently nd that increased IPR strength induces stronger and more positive backward knowledge
diusion. For horizontal and forward knowledge diusion, the eects are somewhat less robust.
23The bars in the gure display the coecient estimates for the three MNE variables, taking into account the
dierent IPR levels. We use the estimates of column 1 in Table 5 as the basis for this gure, because it excludes
Hong Kong, which appears to be a clear outlier in our sample in terms of IPR strength.
24Note that this is due to the fact that the individual (i.e. non-interacted) eects of the MNE variables capture
the eects in countries with zero IPR, which we do not have in our sample.
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Horizontal knowledge spillovers indeed seem to decrease with increased IPR strength, as ex-
pected. However, this result is somewhat sensitive to the use of lagged realizations of MNE
activity. The results for forward or downstream knowledge diusion do not correspond well
with our expectations: Increased IPR strength seems to depress forward knowledge diusion,
and even generates strong negative eects on local rms, most likely due to competition eects.
However, this result is also somewhat senstive to the use of lagged realizations of MNE activity,
as well as to changing the measure of IPR strength. Moroever, as suggested by Javorcik (2008),
forward knowledge diusion might be particularly salient for downstream service rms, which
we do not consider here. Within manufacturing, adverse competition eects might indeed dom-
inate positive knowledge diusion, as MNEs can more easily force higher input prices and hence
lower margins on their downstream customers.
Overall, our results seem to suggest that both arguments in the IPR protection debate have
some empirical bite. The question then arises which of the two eects dominates. This question
is not easily answered, as our results and the specic coecient estimates tend to vary across
the dierent specications. Moreover, it is dicult to pick a preferred specication. Still, we
briey attempt a back-of-the-envelope evaluation to put some numbers to the debate, using
the estimates of column 1 in Table 5 as our point of departure.25 First consider the impact of
horizontal knowledge spillovers. In the countries with the lowest 2000 IPR index (Canada and
Finland with an index of 3.9), a one standard deviation increase of horizontal MNE activity
(1.93) increases local rms' TFP by approximately 8.7%.26 The corresponding backward and
forward impacts of MNE activity are -9.2% and 5.6% respectively, generating a net increase
of 5.1%.27 Redoing these calculations for the country with the highest IPR index (the United
States with an index of 5) yields Horizontal, Backward and Forward eects of -29.5%, 41.6%
and -19.7% respectively, yielding a net eect of -7.6%. These calculations seem to imply that
the (contemporaneous) static eciency argument for low IPR has more merit for domestic
rms than the dynamic eciency argument for high IPR. However, we also noted that only
the backward eects of MNE activity are robust across all specications. If we only take these
25This particular specication excludes Hong Kong as an outlier in terms of IPR strength, and the coecient
estimates are approximately in-between the extremes of the various estimates reported in Section 4.
26Recall that TFP is measured in logs, so that the coecients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. Hence,
the total impact is computed as 0:747 1:93  0:180 1:93 3:9.
27The standard devations of Backward and Forward are 0.74 and 2.19 respectively. Also note that this net
eect is a national average. Dierent rms are aected asymmetrically, depending on their various relationships
with respect to MNEs.
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into account, it is clear that strong national IPR systems are strongly preferred over weak IPR
systems. A similar conclusion follows if we only consider the combined eects of horizontal and
backward, or forward and backward eects.
Somewhat disappointingly then, it still proves to be dicult to have the nal verdict out on
the desirability of strong national IPR systems. If we take a conservative approach regarding our
estimation results, we should only consider the backward knowledge diusion eects of MNEs
as being robust. In that case, our results make a strong case for strengthening national IPR
systems, as this will stimulate MNE-supplier knowledge and technology transfer, yielding strong
productivity gains for local rms in upstream industries. It also implies that FDI policies only
aimed at attracting inward MNE activity by themselves are not sucient to ensure domestic
benets. Developing a strong system of IPR protection and facilitating linkages between local
suppliers and MNEs appear to be necessary conditions for policy in this regard.
Finally, our study suers from some shortcomings that provide opportunities for future re-
search. We only mention the two most salient ones here. First, our sample consists only of
very large rms, which could seriously bias the coecient estimates. Given that these large
rms often dominate local markets and are prone to have strong linkages with each other and
foreign MNEs, it is likely that the competition eects will be more adverse, biasing our results
downward. At the same time, however, larger rms will be more productive and technologically
advanced, making their knowledge transfers more eective. This could lead to an upward bias
in our results. Working with samples including small(er) rms seems warranted to get rid of
these biases. Second, the countries in our sample are all (fairly) well developed, which could also
bias our results in various ways. The literature on the importance of absorptive capacity and
technological distance in relation to FDI knowledge diusion would imply that the local rms
in these countries are particularly well equiped to benet from foreign MNE activity (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1989; Grith et al., 2004). Additionally, the variation in national IPR system
strength is seriously limited in this sample of countries. Eectively, we have no countries with
truly weak IPR, which again might lead to (too) favourable results regarding the knowledge
diusion impact of MNE activity. Because of these reasons, expanding the sample of countries
to include a more heterogeneous country population is strongly desirable. Fortunately, given
the increased availability of detailed rm-level dataset in countries across the globe, as well as
18
datasets combining such data for various countries simultaneously, such research opportunities
should prove to be within reach in a not too distant future.
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Appendix
For the purposes of this paper, we collected information for all publicly listed non-nancial rms
in 22 countries, i.e. all countries where a sucient number rms with reliable data were present
in the Worldscope database. However, for Japan and the United States, because of time and
cost constraints, we collected information only on one third of the rms present in the database,
accounting for a representative sample in terms of size and 4-digit industry. More precisely, in
each of these countries we rst divided the rms into ten groups according to size. Within each
of these ten groups we then ordered the rms by their 4-digit primary SIC code. Within each
of these industries we then selected every third rm from the total.
In order to obtain information on the extent of foreign (and local) ownership, we supple-
mented these data with information from the \Who owns whom" database, for which we only
had access for the year 2004. In several cases the information in this dataset was not satisfac-
tory. In such cases we augmented the dataset with information from other sources, primarily
company websites and annual reports. In particular, for rms with dual-class shares the infor-
mation from Thomson turned out to be insucient, since it reects the ownership structure of
22
only one class of shares. In many instances (especially in Scandinavia), these are actually the
shares with subordinate voting rights, mostly because the shares with full voting rights are not
listed. We identied the companies with dual class shares via Thomson Datastream. Fifteen
companies of this type for which we could not nd data from alternative sources were excluded
from the sample.
In some cases the total percentage of shareholdings reported by Thomson was greater than
100%. For ve of these companies we could not nd information from alternative sources and
excluded them from the dataset. In some cases the fraction of total shareholding reported in
\Who owns whom" is quite low, raising doubts about the presence of all substantial share-
holders in this dataset. For companies where the fraction of total shareholding reported was
less than 10%, we collected information using other sources, and were often able to identify
investors holding very substantial fractions of shares. For forty-eight of these companies we
could not nd additional ownership information, so that we excluded them from the dataset.
Finally, we excluded companies where the largest equity stake at the moment of reporting was
larger than 20% and was held by the company itself (four companies) or a broker-dealer rm
(ve companies). This procedure resulted in a dataset of about 2,500 rms from 22 industrial
countries.
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Table 2: Average foreign ownership shares per industry
Industry Average ownership (%) Standard Deviation
Food products and beverages 38.48 22.52
Textiles 46.77 27.75
Wood and wood products 83.57 14.59
Paper and paper products 60.70 21.88
Coke, petroleum and fuel 55.11 18.41
Chemicals 42.22 28.81
Rubber and plastic products 54.61 26.78
Other non-metallic and mineral products 60.27 26.29
Basic metals 45.31 29.53
Fabricated metal products 42.76 19.10
Machinery and equipment 45.74 24.07
Electrical machinery and apparatus 42.25 24.08
Medical precision and optical instruments 50.43 15.83
Motor vehicles 36.00 18.05
Furniture 54.18 25.40
Construction 53.98 13.70
Table 3: The impact of MNE activity on local productivity: Base-
line estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal 0:004  0:001  0:005  0:002
(0:007) (0:007) (0:011) (0:002)
Backward 0:040 0:051 0:038 0:006
(0:028) (0:022) (0:036) (0:008)
Forward  0:012  0:010  0:005  0:000
(0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Log total assets 0:238 0:095 0:259  0:011
(0:027) (0:033) (0:029) (0:005)
Salesshare 1:215 1:668 1:205 0:058
(0:209) (0:226) (0:231) (0:022)
Constant 1:944 3:667 1:688 0:020
(0:347) (0:421) (0:377) (0:079)
N 14; 151 14; 151 12; 027 11; 465
Rsq 0:08 0:14 0:09
Sargan statistic 131:1
Hansen statistic 71:2
AR1  5:60
AR2 1:25
No. instruments 58
 p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country-industry level within parentheses. All GLS models in columns 1-3
are estimated with rm FE. Column 2 includes year FE (not reported).
Column 3 uses one-year lagged realizations of MNE activity. Column 4 is
estimated using system GMM. The lagged dependent variable is not
reported.
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Table 4: The impact of MNE activity on local productivity: Na-
tional IPR strength
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizontal 0:113 0:065 0:071  0:003
(0:036) (0:036) (0:073) (0:015)
 IPR  0:033  0:020  0:024  0:000
(0:011) (0:011) (0:023) (0:004)
Backward  1:475  1:085  1:351  0:198
(0:569) (0:544) (0:739) (0:118)
 IPR 0:374 0:279 0:342 0:053
(0:139) (0:132) (0:183) (0:030)
Forward 0:570 0:428 0:516 0:074
(0:181) (0:167) (0:235) (0:034)
 IPR  0:137  0:103  0:123  0:018
(0:043) (0:040) (0:055) (0:008)
Log total assets 0:235 0:094 0:255  0:009
(0:026) (0:033) (0:029) (0:004)
Salesshare 1:236 1:677 1:209 0:066
(0:209) (0:225) (0:231) (0:020)
Constant 1:994 3:691 1:749 0:079
(0:339) (0:414) (0:372) (0:065)
N 14,151 14,151 12,027 11,465
Rsq 0.08 0.14 0.09
F-statistic 10:7 5:2 6:7
Sargan statistic 167:5
Hansen statistic 111:4
AR1  5:68
AR2 1.25
No. instruments 100
 p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country-industry level within parentheses. All GLS models in columns 1-3
are estimated with rm FE. Column 2 includes year FE (not reported).
Column 3 uses one-year lagged realizations of MNE activity. Column 4 is
estimated using system GMM. The lagged dependent variable is not
reported.
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Table 5: The impact of MNE activity on local productivity: Robustness analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Horizontal 0:747 0:982 0:513 0:061 0:913
(0:185) (0:260) (0:140) (0:070) (0:534)
 IPR  0:180  0:237  0:127  0:021  0:053
(0:044) (0:057) (0:032) (0:020) (0:035)
 GDP  0:067
(0:045)
Backward  2:558  3:792  2:192  1:216  5:179
(0:810) (1:053) (0:930) (0:728) (1:435)
 IPR 0:624 0:923 0:535 0:309 0:210
(0:197) (0:253) (0:224) (0:180) (0:114)
 GDP 0:421
(0:137)
Forward 0:435 0:596 0:411 0:478 0:661
(0:219) (0:288) (0:262) (0:231) (0:390)
 IPR  0:105  0:143  0:097  0:114  0:066
(0:052) (0:068) (0:062) (0:055) (0:030)
 GDP  0:038
(0:032)
Log total assets 0:274 0:293 0:304 0:255 0:131
(0:029) (0:050) (0:028) (0:029) (0:033)
Salesshare 1:044 1:472 0:829 1:208 1:482
(0:227) (0:401) (0:217) (0:231) (0:256)
Log GDP per capita 2:680
(0:220)
Constant 1:548 1:219 1:202 1:743  24:37
(0:375) (0:652) (0:370) (0:321) (2:035)
N 11,382 4745 9730 12,027 12,027
Rsq 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.17
 p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-industry level
within parentheses. All models are estimated with rm FE and one-year lagged MNE variables,
unless indicated otherwise. Column 1 excludes Hong Kong from the sample. Column 2 excludes
observations with zero MNE activity. Column 3 uses two-year lagged realizations of MNE
activity. Column 4 uses the 2005 IPR index. Column 5 includes (log) GDP per capita as an
additional control variable.
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Figure 1: Correlation between local rms' TFP and horizontal MNE activity: High versus low
IPR countries.
Figure 2: Correlation between local rms' TFP and downstream MNE activity: High versus
low IPR countries.
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Figure 3: Correlation between local rms' TFP and upstream MNE activity: High versus low
IPR countries.
Figure 4: Estimated horizontal, backward and forward coecients at various levels of the IPR
index.
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